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DEFINING AWAY RELIGIOUS FREEDOM IN 
EUROPE: HOW FOUR DEMOCRACIES GET 
AWAY WITH DISCRIMINATING AGAINST 
MINORITY RELIGIONS 
Nathaniel Stinnett*
Abstract: Despite multiple international and regional prohibitions 
against religious discrimination, many European Democracies continue 
to discriminate against minority religions. In particular, this discrim-
ination often occurs due to deªnitional ambiguity surrounding the term 
“religion.” Using the examples of Russian, Belgian, French, and German 
law, this Note reveals how many countries violate the international treaties 
to which they are signatories by deªning many religious groups as “sects,” 
“cults,” or groups otherwise unworthy of ofªcial “religion” status. After 
discussing the necessary components of a succesful deªnition of 
“religion,” this Note argues that the most effective way to protect freedom 
of religion is to abandon the term “religion” altogether and adopt a 
polythetic approach that protects a list of various religious practices, not 
religion, from discriminatory treatment. 
Introduction 
 Article 18 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Universal 
Declaration) succinctly enshrines religious freedom, stating “[e]veryone 
has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion; this right 
includes freedom to change his religion or belief, and freedom, either 
alone or in community with others and in public or private, to manifest 
his religion or belief in teaching, practice, worship and observance.”1 
Other international agreements even legally oblige the vast majority of 
the world’s nations to respect religious freedom; nevertheless, the right 
to religious freedom continues to be restricted throughout the world.2
                                                                                                                      
* Nathaniel Stinnett is the Editor-in-Chief of the Boston College International & Compara-
tive Law Review. 
1 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A (III), U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., 
art. 18, U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948), reprinted in Basic Documents on Human Rights (Ian 
Brownlie ed., 3d ed. 1993) [hereinafter Univeral Declaration]. 
2 Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, U.S. Dep’t of State, International 
Religious Freedom Report 2002: Executive Summary, ¶¶ 2–3 (October 7, 2002), available 
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 Although totalitarian and authoritarian regimes are often the 
worst enemies of religious freedom, their persecution of religious mi-
norities is usually blatant, well-publicized, and clearly denounced by 
the rest of the world.3 What often goes unreported is that many of the 
world’s democracies are just as guilty of restricting religious freedom 
as the totalitarian regimes that they so often denounce.4 In particular, 
some European democracies create ofªcial religious hierarchies or 
discriminate against minority religions by categorizing them as “sects” 
or “cults.”5 These categorizations not only render such “cults” ineligi-
ble for certain government beneªts and protections, but also often 
stigmatize religious minorities in such a way that they are subject to 
abuse within their communities.6 Furthermore, non-democratic na-
tions often copy these “anti-cult” laws, using them as a basis for out-
right discrimination and persecution.7
 So many countries slip through the legal loopholes of religious 
freedom for two basic reasons: (1) “religion” is almost impossible to 
deªne; and (2) a group’s freedom of religion is always measured 
against the State’s need to maintain public order.8 This Note focuses 
on how best to close the deªnitional loopholes and ensure that free-
dom of thought, conscience, and religion are rights enjoyed by every 
individual, regardless of the spiritual community to which he or she 
belongs. First, I discuss the ways in which four European democracies 
restrict the freedom of minority and non-traditional religions; second, 
I show how the applicable international law, while explicitly forbid-
ding such restrictions, is ridden with loopholes; third, I describe why 
there is no acceptable legal deªnition of religion; and fourth, I argue 
that group-oriented legal distinctions should be abandoned for a bal-
ance between individual freedoms and maintaining public order. 
                                                                                                                      
at http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/irf/2002/13608.htm [hereinafter State Dep’t, Execu-
tive Summary]. 
3 Id. pt. I, ¶¶ 1–7. 
4 Id. ¶¶ 4–5. 
5 Id. ¶ 5. 
6 State Dep’t, Executive Summary, supra note 2, ¶¶ 4–6. 
7 Id. ¶ 5. 
8 See Anne S.Y. Cheung, In Search of a Theory of Cult and Freedom of Religion in China: The 
Case of Falun Gong, 13 Pac. Rim L. & Pol’y J. 1, 4–8 (2004). 
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I. Four Countries: Four examples of Restricting the  
Freedom of Minority Religions 
 It was largely in response to a series of religiously-inspired mass 
suicides during the mid-1990s, that many European governments be-
gan to restrict the freedoms of certain minority religions.9 In particu-
lar, from 1995–1997, members of the Order of the Solar Temple 
committed numerous murder-suicides in France and Switzerland re-
sulting in the deaths of over sixty people.10 France and Belgium ex-
plicitly characterized their “anti-cult” legislation and practices as a re-
action to the Solar Temple suicides,11 whereas Germany and Russia 
have simply stated a desire to target “totalitarian sects” or groups that 
are dangerous to the democratic order.12 Regardless of the motivating 
incidents behind the discriminatory legislation of various European 
countries, most governments are consistent in that they justify such 
restrictions of religious freedom in the name of tradition, culture, and 
maintaining public safety.13
 Although the impetus behind such anti-cult legislation is to pre-
vent the many societal dangers that spring from religious groups, the 
result has been the creation of two-tiered societies, where certain re-
ligions enjoy far more rights and freedom than do others.14 Although 
many European countries have passed some sort of anti-cult legisla-
tion, I have chosen to highlight the paths taken by the Russian Fed-
eration (Russia), Belgium, France, and Germany.15 I concentrate on 
these four countries largely because they each contain examples of 
                                                                                                                      
9 See Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, U.S. Dep’t of State, Interna-
tional Religious Freedom Report 2002: France, § II, ¶ 13, (October 7, 2002) available at 
http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/irf/2002/13938.htm [hereinafter State Dep’t, France 
Report]; see also State Dep’t, Executive Summary, supra note 2, ¶ 5. 
10 Am. Fam. Found., Cult Mass Suicide Timeline, at http://www.csj.org/ 
studyindex/studycult/suicides.htm (last visited May 11, 2005). 
11 State Dep’t, France Report, supra note 9, § II, ¶ 13; Bureau of Democracy, Human 
Rights, and Labor, U.S. Dep’t of State, International Religious Freedom Report 2002: Bel-
gium, § II, ¶ 6 (October 7, 2002), available at http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/irf/2002/ 
13924.htm [hereinafter State Dep’t, Belgium Report]. 
12 Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, U.S. Dep’t of State, International 
Religious Freedom Report 2002: Russia, § II, ¶ 4 (October 7, 2002), available at http:// 
www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/irf/2002/13958.htm [hereinafter State Dep’t, Russia Report]; 
Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, U.S. Dep’t of State, International Reli-
gious Freedom Report 2002: Germany, ¶ 4 (October 7, 2002), available at http://www. 
state.gov/g/drl/rls/irf/2002/13936.htm [hereinafter State Dep’t, Germany Report]. 
13 See State Dep’t, Executive Summary, supra note 2, ¶¶ 6–7. 
14 Id. ¶¶ 4–7. 
15 Id. ¶ 5 
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relatively “innocent” religious organizations that have been harmed 
by anti-cult laws.16
A. Russia 
 After the fall of the Soviet Union, Russia incorporated into its 
legal code a 1990 Soviet law known as “On Freedom of Religious Con-
fession” (FRC).17 The FRC declared all religions equal under the law, 
mandated the separation of church and state, and established volun-
tary registration procedures for religious groups so that they could 
gain tax exemptions and establish ofªcial places of worship.18 Since its 
ratiªcation on December 12, 1993, the Russian Constitution has also 
guaranteed freedom of religious expression, equality of religions, and 
separation of church and state.19 Unfortunately, practice does not al-
ways follow principle, and federal and local governments often do not 
respect the Constitution’s provision for equality of religions.20
 Perhaps the most egregious example of the Russian govern-
ment’s explicit discrimination against certain religious groups can be 
found in the 1997 law known as “On Freedom of Conscience and on 
Religious Associations” (FCA).21 The FCA categorizes all religious 
communities either as “groups” or “organizations,” with the rights and 
activities of those designated as “groups” being severely limited.22 
Only after existing within Russia for ªfteen years with at least ten citi-
zen members, may a religious congregation register and qualify for 
“organization” status, thereby gaining the legal status of a juridicial 
person.23 Juridicial person status is extraordinarily important since it 
permits the “organization” to enjoy certain tax beneªts, proselytize, 
open a bank account, own property, conduct worship services in pris-
ons and state-owned hospitals, publish literature, and issue invitations 
to foreigners.24 Furthermore, representative ofªces of foreign reli-
                                                                                                                      
16 Id. pt. I, ¶¶ 35, 38–40. 
17 State Dep’t, Russia Report, supra note 12, § II, ¶ 3. 
18 Id. 
19 Konstitutsiia RF, art. 28, available at http://www.departments.bucknell.edu/russian/ 
const/ch2.html (last visited May 11, 2005). 
20 State Dep’t, Russia Report, supra note 12, ¶ 1. 
21 See Grazhdanskii Kodeks RF (“On Freedom of Conscience and on Religious Associa-
tions”), chs. II-III, (1997), available at http://www.law.emory.edu/EILR/special/97law.html 
(last visited May 11, 2005) [hereinafter FCA]. 
22 State Dep’t, Russia Report, supra note 12, § II, ¶ 4; FCA, supra note 21, chs. II–III. 
23 FCA, supra note 21, art. 9.1. 
24 State Dep’t, Russia Report, supra note 12, § II, ¶ 5; FCA, supra note 21, chs. II–III. 
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gious organizations must obtain “organization” status simply to con-
duct liturgical services and other religious activities.25
 Although the FCA gives no explicit rationale for creating this two-
tiered system, article 3.2 of the law does state that religious freedom 
may be curtailed to defend “the constitutional system, morality, 
health, or the rights and legal interests of man and citizen . . . ,” or to 
secure “the defense of the country and the security of the state.”26 
However, the U.S. Department of State has characterized the FCA in 
another manner, claiming that the intent of some of the FCA’s spon-
sors “appears to have been to discriminate against members of foreign 
and less established religions by making it difªcult for them to mani-
fest their beliefs through organized religious institutions.”27
 Indeed, the FCA’s discriminatory registration and classiªcation 
processes have effectively disenfranchised thousands of minority reli-
gious associations, many of which are foreign, and few (if any) of which 
pose any threat to Russian society.28 Those religious associations that 
had previously registered under the more liberal FRC had to re-register 
under the FCA regime by December 31, 2000 or face deprivation of 
juridicial status by a process known as “liquidation.”29 By the 2000 dead-
line, the time and expense of the FCA’s registration process had proven 
onerous enough that an estimated 2,095 previously registered organiza-
tions were subject to liquidation.30 However, time and expense are not 
the only barriers of the registration, re-registration, and liquidation 
processes; the FCA often is used as a blatant tool of discrimination even 
against well-funded, international organizations.31 The Salvation Army 
was liquidated for years because it was described as a paramilitary or-
ganization; many Jehova’s Witnesses congregations have been deemed 
“a threat to society”; and local governments often simply forbid Mus-
lims from even trying to register at all.32 In a few instances (such as with 
the Salvation Army), the Constitutional Court eventually rules that such 
                                                                                                                      
25 FCA, supra note 21, art. 13. Article 13.1 of the FCA deªnes foreign religious organi-
zations as those which have been “created outside the conªnes of the Russian Federation 
and according to the laws of a foreign state.” Id. 
26 Id. art. 3.2. 
27 State Dep’t, Russia Report, supra note 12, § II, ¶ 4. 
28 Id. § II, ¶ 8. 
29 FCA, supra note 21, art. 27.4.; State Dep’t, Russia Report, supra note 12, § II, ¶ 8 
(noting that the liquidation date of the 1999 amended version of the FCA was postponed 
one year). 
30 State Dep’t, Russia Report, supra note 12, § II, ¶ 8. 
31 Id. § II, ¶ 9. 
32 Id. § II, ¶¶ 23, 26, 28. 
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liquidations are improper, but often times City Courts continue to delay 
or obstruct the rescinding of liquidation orders.33
B. Belgium 
 Much like Russia, Belgium has established a two-tiered society, 
where certain religions are ofªcially recognized, while others are not.34 
Roman Catholicism, Protestantism, Judaism, Anglicanism, Islam, Or-
thodox Christianity (Greek and Russian), and the Council of Non-
Religious Philosophical Communities of Belgium all make up the seven 
ofªcially recognized religious groupings.35 Only these seven ofªcial 
groups have access to certain legal rights and government subsidies for 
everything from ministers and teachers to the renovation of church 
buildings.36 Although the Belgian government does not condemn un-
recognized religious groups, such groups are clearly discriminated 
against in that they are not eligible for government subsidies.37
 For those religions that wish to join this group of seven, their 
recognition process is fraught with vague and subjective criteria, ap-
plied by political decision-making bodies.38 In order to qualify for 
government recognition, a religion must (1) have a structure or hier-
archy, (2) have a sufªcient number of members, (3) have existed in 
the country for a long period of time, (4) offer a social value to the 
public, and (5) abide by the State’s laws and respect the public or-
der.39 The ambiguity of these criteria is further clouded by a lack of 
any deªnitions for the phrases “sufªcient,” “a long period of time,” or 
“social value.”40 Finally, although the Ministry of Justice recommends 
approval or rejection of all applications, the Parliament has ªnal ap-
proval over all recognized status proceedings.41 In short, representa-
tives of the majority go through a vague and arbitrary process for de-
ciding whether to recognize minority religions.42
 To further complicate matters, the Belgian government even has 
begun discriminating among unrecognized religious groups.43 In 
                                                                                                                      
33 Id. § II, ¶ 26. 
34 State Dep’t, Belgium Report, supra note 11, § II, ¶ 2. 
35 Id. 
36 Id. § II, ¶¶ 2–3. 
37 Id. § II, ¶ 5 
38 Id. § II, ¶ 4. 




43 Id. § II, ¶ 6. 
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1996, the Belgian Parliament established a special commission to 
evaluate the potential dangers that religious sects may represent to 
society.44 The commission’s 1997 report classiªed sects into two broad 
categories: those that are respectable (deªned as “organized groups 
of individuals espousing the same doctrine with a religion”) and those 
that are “harmful sectarian organizations.”45 “Harmful sectarian or-
ganizations” were deªned as “groups having or claiming to have a phi-
losophical or religious purpose whose organization or practice in-
volves illegal or injurious activities, harms individuals or society, or 
impairs human dignity.”46
 Attached to the commission’s report was a list of religious groups 
such as Jehova’s Witnesses, the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day 
Saints, the Church of Scientology, and the Young Women’s Christian 
Association.47 This list quickly became known as the “Dangerous Sects 
List” and, although the report’s introduction clearly stated that the list 
merely consisted of those groups that had been mentioned during tes-
timony, the damage was already done.48 When the Parliament adopted 
several of the report’s recommendations, it chose not to adopt the list 
itself; nevertheless, the groups have since been subject to discrimina-
tory treatment by courts, banks, and the general public.49
C. France 
 The French Constitution guarantees freedom of religion, and 
France’s Law of Separation (often referred to as the “1905 Law”) for-
bids discrimination on the basis of faith.50 Although the 1905 Law re-
quires religious communities to register with the government, the regis-
tration process does not seem to be exclusionary, and communities may 
be simultaneously registered in both of the available categories: (1) “as-
sociations cultuelles” (tax-exempt worship associations) or (2) “associations 
culturelles” (non-tax-exempt cultural associations).51 In order to qualify 
for tax-exempt status, a group’s sole purpose must be the practice of 
religious rituals; therefore, most religious groups separate into both 
                                                                                                                      





49 State Dep’t, Belgium Report, supra note 11, § II, ¶ 6–7. 
50 Law of Dec. 9, 1905, arts. 1–2, J.O., Dec. 11. 1905, p. 7205, excerpts available at 
http://www.justice.gouv.fr/anglais/textfond/cure.html [hereinafter Law of 1905]. 
51 State Dep’t, France Report, supra note 9, § II, ¶ 2. 
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associations cultuelles and associations culturelles, with the latter taking 
charge of publicity, running schools, and other non-ritualistic duties.52
 Although the French government does not create an explicit hi-
erarchy of religions, the French Parliament did follow Belgium’s lead 
by commissioning a Board of Inquiry into Cults in 1996 (1996 Com-
mission).53 The 1996 Commission’s report admitted the difªculty of 
deªning the concept of a cult, yet it did mention the following cult-
like characteristics: 
 Mental destabilization; exorbitant character of the ªnancial 
requirements; isolation from society; danger to physical health; 
embrigadement [forced conscription] of the children; the 
more or less antisocial speech; disorders with the law and or-
der; importance of the legal contentions; the possible diver-
sion of the traditional economic circuits; [and] attempts at 
inªltration of the public authorities.54
Astonishingly, the report of the 1996 Commission proceeded to iden-
tify 173 groups as cults, including the Mormons, Jehovah’s Witnesses, 
the Church of Scientology, and the Theological Institute of Nimes (an 
evangelical Christian Bible College).55 None of these “cults” were 
banned, but many have since claimed to be the victims of intolerance 
and discrimination.56 Following this report in 1998, the government 
also established the “Interministerial Mission in the Fight against 
Sects/Cults” to analyze the “phenomenon of cults” and coordinate 
the government’s response to cult activities.57
 Finally, the June 2001 About-Picard Law lists criminal activities for 
which religious associations could be subject to complete dissolution, 
among which are such vague activities as violating a person’s freedom, 
dignity, or identity; false advertising; and creating or exploiting a psy-
                                                                                                                      
52 Id. 
53 Assemblée Nationale, Rapport fait au Nom de la Commission d’Enquête (1) sur les 
Sectes, (Dec. 22, 1995), available at http://cftf.com/french/Les_Sectes_en_France/cults. 
html [hereinafter French Cult Commission]. 
54 French Cult Commission, supra note 53, § I, A(2d). 
55 Id. § I, B(1); State Dep’t, France Report, supra note 9, § II, ¶ 13. Both the Belgian 
and French parliamentary commissions were formed in response to a number of highly 
publicized mass suicides in the mid-1990s by the Order of the Solar Temple, a religious 
organization with signiªcant membership in France, Switzerland, and Canada. State Dep’t, 
France Report, supra note 9, § II, ¶ 13; State Dep’t, Belgium Report, supra note 11, § II, 
¶ 6. 
56 State Dep’t, France Report, supra note 9, § II, ¶ 13. 
57 Id. § II, ¶ 14. 
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chological or physical dependence.58 Although, as of 2002, no cases 
had been brought under the About-Picard Law, French religious lead-
ers have raised serious concerns about the law’s ambiguity and reach.59
D. Germany 
 Germany’s Constitution provides for freedom of religion and the 
separation of church and state.60 Furthermore, the federal government 
may recognize a religious community by granting it the status of “cor-
poration under public law,” so long as the organization can assure the 
government of its permanence and size and that it contributes socially, 
spiritually, or materially to society.61 Becoming a “corporation under 
public law” is highly desirable because it not only confers tax-exempt 
status upon religions but also entitles them to levy taxes on their own 
members (collected by the State).62 Until recently, religious communi-
ties also had to prove their loyalty to the State for tax-exempt status, but 
under a 2000 Constitutional Court case brought by Jehovah’s Wit-
nesses, the “loyalty to the state” provision was struck down.63
 Despite these encouraging federal developments, several lander 
(states) have published pamphlets harmful to the reputations of vari-
ous religious groups.64 In particular, many such pamphlets focus upon 
the Church of Scientology, a favorite target of both the federal and 
state Ofªces for the Protection of the Constitution (OPCs).65 For ex-
ample, in 1998, the Hamberg OPC published “The Intelligence Ser-
vice of the Scientology Organization,” a pamphlet claiming that Sci-
entology’s spies were inªltrating workplaces and governments to 
prepare for their ªnal destruction.66 Furthermore, until March 2001, 
federal and state governments required all ªrms bidding on govern-
                                                                                                                      
58 A Bill Directed to the Reinforcement of Prevention and Repression of Cultic Move-
ments which Undermine Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (May 30, 2001), 
available at http://www.antisectes.net/law2001-cesnur.htm; State Dep’t, France Report, 
supra note 9, § II, ¶ 14. 
59 State Dep’t, France Report, supra note 9, § II, ¶ 15. 
60 Grundgesetz, arts. 3, 4, 7 , available at http://www.lib.byu.edu/~rdh/eurodocs/ 
germ/ggeng.html (last visited May 11, 2005) [hereinafter German Constitution]. 
61 State Dep’t, Germany Report, supra note 12, § II, ¶ 2. 
62 Id. 
63 Id. 
64 Id. § II, ¶ 10. 
65 Id. § II, ¶¶ 10–11. 
66 Bundesamt für Verfassungs-schutz- Hamburg, Der Geheimdienst der Scientology-
Organisation—Grundlagen, Aufgaben, Strukturen, Methoden und Ziele—Zweite Auºage, 
Stand, (May 6, 1998), §§ I, IV, available at http://cisar.org/books/trn1050.htm (last visited 
May 11, 2005). 
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ment contracts to sign contracts stating that none of the ªrm’s em-
ployees were Scientologists.67 Although the federal government has 
since limited the scope of this “sect ªlter,” Scientologists continue to 
report wide-spread ofªcial discrimination throughout Germany.68
II. European and International Standards of Religious 
Freedom and How They Deªne Religion 
 The many international legal standards that apply to Belgium, 
France, Germany, and Russia clearly guarantee freedom of religion, 
while often balancing that freedom with States’ rights to secure the 
public safety and rights of individuals.69 Unfortunately, these instru-
ments rarely deªne “religion” in a clear and deªnitive way,70 often 
because “religion” is very difªcult to deªne in legal terms.71 Indeed, 
in an attempt to overcome this difªculty, international legal instru-
ments often refer to “freedom of thought, conscience, and religion” 
in toto and sometimes even resort to cataloguing speciªc rights and 
practices rather than bothering to deªne any of these three free-
doms.72 The result is an impressive body of international law support-
ing freedom of religion, with little hint as to which religious group-
ings qualify for these guarantees of freedom.73
A. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
 Truly a landmark document, the Universal Declaration was 
passed by the United Nations in 1948, shortly after the horrors of 
World War II had subsided.74 Although the Universal Declaration im-
poses no legally-binding obligations, it has since lived up to its claim 
as “a common standard of achievement for all peoples and all nations 
. . . ,” serving as the basis for all human rights instruments that have 
followed it.75 In particular, the language of article 18’s guarantee of 
                                                                                                                      
67 State Dep’t, Germany Report, supra note 12, § II, ¶ 15. 
68 Id. § II, ¶¶ 15–16. 
69 See State Dep’t, Executive Summary, supra note 2, ¶ 4. 
70 Id.; Natan Lerner, The Nature and Minimum Standards of Freedom of Religion or Belief, 
2000 BYU L. Rev. 905, 907–08. 
71 See Lerner, supra note 70, at 907. 
72 Id. at 907–08. Freedom of “belief” is also often inserted after “religion,” so as to in-
clude atheistic, agnostic, and rationalistic world views. Id. 
73 Id. at 931–32. 
74 Derek H. Davis, The Evolution of Religious Freedom as a Universal Human Right: Examin-
ing the Role of the 1981 United Nations Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Intolerance 
and of Discrimination Based on Religion or Belief, 2002 BYU L. Rev. 217, 224–25. 
75 Universal Declaration, supra note 1, ¶ 1. 
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“the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion . . .” for all 
humankind has been mimicked time and again when deªning the 
legal parameters of religious freedom.76 Unfortunately, broad moral 
aspirations do not always translate into concise legal documents, and 
international law has yet to deªne “freedom of religion” in the years 
since the Universal Declaration’s passage.77
B. European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights  
and Fundamental Freedoms 
 Since being signed in Rome on November 4, 1950, the European 
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms (European Convention) has been ratiªed by forty-ªve coun-
tries, including Belgium, France, Germany, and Russia.78 Article 9 of 
the European Convention not only guarantees “freedom of thought, 
conscience and religion,” but also that the 
[f]reedom to manifest one’s religion or beliefs shall be sub-
ject only to such limitations as are prescribed by law and are 
necessary in a democratic society in the interests of public 
safety, for the protection of public order, health or morals, 
or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.79
Article 9, like the rest of the European Convention, is subject to the 
interpretation of the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR), and 
the ECHR has clearly read article 9 to protect religions from discrimi-
natory treatment.80
 In 1993, the ECHR ªrst interpreted article 9 in the case of Kokki-
nakas v. Greece, where Mr. Kokkinakas had been convicted under a 
Greek law that restricted proselytizing by Jehovah’s Witnesses.81 The 
ECHR held that the Greek law violated article 9, in part, because the 
                                                                                                                      
76 Id., art. 18; Davis, supra note 74, at 225–26. 
77 See Lerner, supra note 70, at 930–32. 
78 Council of Europe, Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamen-
tal Freedoms, Member States of the Council of Europe, available at http://conven 
tions.coe.int/Treaty/Commun/ChercheSig.asp?NT=005&CM=8&DF+05/04/04&CL=EN
G.htm (last visited May 11, 2005). 
79 European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Free-
doms, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 222, art. 9 (entered into force Sept. 3, 1953), reprinted in 
Basic Documents on Human Rights (Ian Brownlie ed., 3d ed. 1993) [hereinafter European 
Convention]. 
80 Id. art. 19; Christopher J. Miner, Losing My Religion: Austria’s New Religion Law in Light 
of International and European Standards of Religions Freedom, 1998 BYU L. Rev. 607, 623–26. 
81 Kokkinakas v. Greece, 260 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1993); Miner, supra note 80, at 624. 
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restrictions upon Jehovah’s Witnesses were neither “proportionate,” 
nor “‘necessary . . . for the protection of the rights and freedoms of 
others.’”82 Also in 1993, the ECHR decided Hoffman v. Austria, a case 
in which an Austrian woman had been denied custody of her children 
because, as a Jehovah’s Witness, her beliefs would endanger her chil-
dren’s well-being.83 In ªnding that Austria had violated the European 
Convention, the ECHR admitted that Austria’s aim had been legiti-
mate (protecting children), but also held that Austria had impermis-
sibly discriminated against Mrs. Hoffman because she was a Jehovah’s 
Witness.84 In short, the ECHR stated that the European Convention 
affords “protection against different treatment, without an objective 
and reasonable justiªcation, of persons in similar situations.”85
 Taken together, Kokkinakas and Hoffman stand for the distinct 
notion that the European Convention “may not always protect par-
ticular religious beliefs, but it does protect religions from distinctions 
and unequal protection based solely upon membership in that relig-
ion.”86 Unfortunately, the European Convention does not clearly 
deªne the terms “religion” and “belief.”87 And although the ECHR 
has stated in Manoussakis v. Greece that a State may not “determine 
whether religious beliefs or the means used to express such beliefs are 
legitimate,” Belgium, France, Germany, and Russia clearly still decide 
what is, or is not, a bona ªde religion.88
C. The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
 Belgium, France, Germany, and Russia are also parties to the In-
ternational Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (International Cove-
                                                                                                                      
82 Miner, supra note 80, at 624 (citing Kokkinakas, 260 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1993), 
quoting article 9 of the European Convention). 
83 Hoffman v. Austria, 255 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 45 (1993). In denying custody, the 
Austrian court feared that the mother might refuse her children blood transfusions on 
religious grounds and that the mother’s religious beliefs would make the children social 
outcasts. Miner, supra note 80, at 625–26. 
84 Hoffman, 255 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 59–60; Miner, supra note 80, at 625–26. 
85 Hoffman, 255 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 158. 
86 Miner, supra note 80, at 626. 
87 European Convention, supra note 79, art. 9. 
88 Manoussakis v. Greece, 260 Eur. Ct. H.R. (Ser. A)(1996). As is pointed out in Section 
IV of this paper, it is unrealistic for the ECHR to prohibit certain interpretations of “reli-
gious beliefs” effectively, when the European Convention itself does not does not deªne 
“religious beliefs.” See infra notes 148--166 and accompanying text. 
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nant).89 Much like the European Convention, the International Cove-
nant guarantees freedom of religion,90 but it also explicitly provides 
that each country’s laws must “prohibit any discrimination” for reli-
gious reasons.91 In a clearer fashion than the ECHR’s Kokkinakas and 
Hoffman interpretations of the European Convention, the International 
Covenant simply and explicitly prohibits religious discrimination.92
 Although broadly granting protection to freedom of thought, con-
science, religion, and belief, the International Covenant also fails the 
deªnition test in that nowhere does it deªne these frustrating, but ob-
viously important, terms.93 Recognizing this failure, the Human Rights 
Committee, established under the International Covenant, has stated: 
[t]he terms “belief” and “religion” are to be broadly con-
strued. Article 18 is not limited in its application to tradi-
tional religions or to religions and beliefs with institutional 
characteristics or practices analogous to those of traditional 
religions. The Committee therefore views with concern any 
tendency to discriminate against any religion or belief for 
any reason, including the fact that they are newly estab-
lished, or represent religious minorities that may be the sub-
ject of hostility on the part of a predominant religious com-
munity.94
In light of the legal environments in Belgium, France, Germany, and 
Russia, it certainly seems that these countries have not complied with 
the Human Rights Committee’s broad construction of “belief” and 
“religion” within the International Convention.95
                                                                                                                      
89 Ofªce of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights—Status of Ratiªcations of 
the Principal International Human Rights Treaties, (as of Nov. 2, 2003), available at 
http://www.cohre.org/downloads/report.pdf. 
90 See International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, adopted Dec. 16, 1966, 999 
U.N.T.S. 171, arts. 18–19 (entered into force Mar. 23, 1976), reprinted in Basic Documents 
on Human Rights (Ian Brownlie ed., 3d ed. 1993) [hereinafter International Covenant]. 
91 International Covenant, supra note 90, art. 26. 
92 Compare International Covenant, supra note 90, art. 26, with Miner, supra note 80, at 
626. 
93 International Covenant, supra note 90, arts. 18, 19, 26. 
94 Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 22, Article 18, 48th Sess., Compi-
lation of General Comments and General Recommendations Adopted by Human Rights 
Treaty Bodies (CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add. 4, Sept. 27, 1993), available at www1.umn.edu/ 
humanrts/gencomm/hrcom22.htm (last visited May 11, 2005) [hereinafter Human Rights 
Committee]. 
95 Id.; State Dep’t, Executive Summary, supra note 2, pt. II, ¶¶ 35, 38–40. 
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D. Non-binding Documents 
 The Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Intolerance 
and of Discrimination Based on Religion or Belief (1981 Declaration) 
was adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations on No-
vember 25, 1981.96 Although it is not a binding treaty obligation, the 
1981 Declaration “is generally regarded throughout the world as 
enumerating the fundamental rights of freedom of religion and belief 
that belong to all persons . . . .”97 Furthermore, the 1981 Declaration 
creates an afªrmative duty among States to “take effective measures to 
prevent and eliminate discrimination on the grounds of religion.”98 
Continuing the unfortunate struggle to deªne religion and belief, the 
1981 Declaration states: 
the expression “intolerance and discrimination based on re-
ligion or belief” means any distinction, exclusion, restriction 
or preference based on religion or belief and having as its 
purpose or as its effect nulliªcation or impairment of the rec-
ognition, enjoyment or exercise of human rights and funda-
mental freedoms on an equal basis.99
 The product of over two year’s of meetings, the Concluding 
Document of the Vienna Meeting 1986 of the Representatives of the 
Participating States of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in 
Europe (Concluding Document) also represents a step toward ensur-
ing religious freedom within the signatory countries.100 Much like the 
Universal Declaration, European Convention, International Covenant, 
and 1981 Declaration, the Concluding Document ensures “the free-
dom of the individual to profess and practice religion or belief,” and it 
seeks “to prevent and eliminate discrimination against individuals or 
                                                                                                                      
96 Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Intolerance and of Discrimination 
Based on Religion or Belief, adopted Nov. 25, 1981, G.A. Res. 36/55, 36 GAOR Supp. (No. 
51) at 171, U.N. Doc. A/36/51 (1982), reprinted in Basic Documents on Human Rights 
(Ian Brownlie ed., 3d ed. 1993) [hereinafter 1981 Declaration]. 
97 Miner, supra note 80, at 628. 
98 1981 Declaration, supra note 96, art. 4(1). 
99 Id. art. 2(2). 
100 Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe, Concluding Document of the 
Vienna Meeting 1986 of Representatives of the Partcipating States of the Conference on 
Security and Co-operation in Europe, Held on the Basis of the Provisions of the Final Act 
Relating to the Follow-up to the Conference, 28 I.L.M. 527 (1989), available at http://www. 
osce.org/docs/english/1973–1990/follow_ups/vienn89e.htm (last visited May 11, 2005) 
[hereinafter Concluding Document]. 
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communities, on the grounds of religion or belief . . . .”101 The Con-
cluding Document is not a self-executing or binding instrument, nor 
does it deªne religion or belief.102 Therefore, although Belgium, 
France, Germany, and Russia are all signatories to the Concluding 
Document, none of these countries would be legally bound to the Con-
cluding Document’s precepts even if those precepts were better 
deªned.103
III. Religions and Cults: How to Distinguish Between Two 
Undeªnable Terms? 
A. Why Is It So Difªcult to Deªne Freedom of Religion? 
 Not only do the previously discussed human rights instruments 
fail to deªne “religion,” but the term remains completely undeªned 
across the entire spectrum of international law.104 And although legal 
rights often go undeªned, freedom of religion is a right fraught with 
unique deªnitional difªculties.105
 T. Jeremy Gunn has explained that the difªculty in deªning relig-
ion often lies in both the underlying assumptions about the nature of 
religion and the linguistic form in which its deªnitions are pre-
sented.106 Gunn suggests that deªnitions of religion usually begin by 
presuming one of three principal theories about the nature of relig-
ion: 
ªrst, religion in its metaphysical or theological sense (e.g., the 
underlying truth of the existence of God, the dharma, etc.); 
second, religion as it is psychologically experienced by people 
(e.g., the feelings of the religious believer about divinity or ul-
timate concerns, the holy, etc.); and third, religion as a cul-
tural or social force (e.g., symbolism that binds a community 
together or separates it from other communities).107
                                                                                                                      
101 Id. principles 16, 16.1; Davis, supra note 74, at 227. 
102 See Concluding Document, supra note 100, principles 16, 16.1; Davis, supra note 74, 
at 227. 
103 See Concluding Document, supra note 100, ¶ 1. 
104 T. Jeremy Gunn, The Complexity of Religion and the Deªnition of “Religion” in Interna-
tional Law, 16 Harv. Hum. Rts. J. 189, 189–90 (2003). 
105 Id. at 190–92. 
106 Id. at 193–95. 
107 Id. at 193–94. 
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Furthermore, each deªnition of religion will take either an “essential-
ist” or a “polythetic” linguistic form.108 An essentialist deªnition of 
religion assumes that each religion shares certain common elements 
with other religions, and so identiªes those common elements within 
an all-inclusive deªnition of religion.109 Conversely, polythetic 
deªnitions of religion assume no speciªc common element, and 
therefore describe religious practices and thoughts with the hope that 
a family resemblance might be detected.110
 In addition to these methodological difªculties, when creating a 
set of rules that will regulate every day life, those who craft legal 
deªnitions of religion often stumble upon the practical difªculties of 
religions interacting with established social and cultural norms.111 For 
instance, many statutory and judicial characterizations of religion may 
contain historical biases in favor of traditional or familiar faiths, “[t]hus 
legal systems may explicitly or implicitly evaluate (or rank) religions.”112
B. The Deªnitional Problems Encountered by Russia, Belgium,  
France, and Germany 
 Although Russia makes no explicit statutory or judicial attempt to 
deªne religion (thereby avoiding any linguistic difªculties), the FCA’s 
two-tiered categorization of religious communities reveals many of the 
methodological and practical ºaws discussed by Gunn.113 First, by 
concentrating solely upon a community’s size and permanence within 
Russia, the FCA’s approach neglects two of the three principal theo-
ries of the nature of religion (the metaphysical and psychological as-
pects of religion), in favor of an approach that views religion purely as 
a cultural or social force.114 Second, the FCA is a perfect example of 
how legal deªnitions of religion often founder upon the rocks of 
practical social and historical biases.115 The two dominant spiritual 
forces in recent Russian history have been the Soviet atheistic legacy 
and the previous (and secretly concurrent) hegemony of Russian Or-
                                                                                                                      
108 Id. at 194. 
109 Gunn, supra note 104, at 194. 
110 Id. at 194–95 (citing Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations 32e (G. E. 
M. Anscombe trans., Blackwell 3d ed. 1958)). 
111 Id. at 195–96. 
112 Id. at 196. 
113 FCA, supra note 21, chs. II–III; see Gunn, supra note 104, at 190–95. 
114 FCA, supra note 21, art. 9.1; see Gunn, supra note 104, at 193–94. 
115 State Dep’t, Russia Report, supra note 12, § II, ¶ 2; Gunn, supra note 104, at 195–97. 
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thodoxy.116 Indeed, the FCA even explicitly recognizes the “special 
contribution of Orthodoxy to the history of Russia and to the estab-
lishment and development of Russia’s spirituality and culture.”117 
Judged against these social considerations, it should come as no sur-
prise that Russian laws on religious freedom test a spiritual commu-
nity’s legitimacy by its size and permanence.118
 Like Russia, Belgium’s process for ofªcially recognizing a religion 
depends upon an exclusively “cultural force” view of the nature of re-
ligion, excluding the more personal metaphysical and psychological 
aspects of religion.119 Although Belgium does not have Russia’s his-
tory of hegemonic spiritual dominance, practical social concerns have 
clearly led the Belgian government to establish criteria that deªne 
religion in a way that (like Russia) stresses structure, size, and perma-
nence.120 Indeed, the very fact that the Belgian Parliament retains 
ªnal approval of all recognition proceedings further emphasizes the 
majoritarian social pressure upon deciding which religions shall be 
deemed legitimate.121
 Like Russia and Belgium, France does not offer an explicit legal 
deªnition of religion, yet the French system of dividing communities 
into associations cultuelles and associations culturelles reveals a distinctly 
different view of the nature of religion.122 Whether a group qualiªes 
for tax-exempt, associations cultuelles status depends upon the existence 
of ritualism and the absence of more secular concerns such as public-
ity and education.123 Although this view acknowledges the social as-
pects of religion (a group’s unique symbolism and activities), the 
French approach also recognizes the metaphysical aspect of religion 
as something that is divorced from every-day, secular activities.124 This 
unique approach must surely stem from the practical difªculties of 
ªtting a legal deªnition of religion into an historically secularist po-
litical society.125
                                                                                                                      
116 State Dep’t, Russia Report, supra note 12, § II, ¶ 2. 
117 FCA, supra note 21, ¶ 2. 
118 See id. art. 9. 
119 See State Dep’t, Belgium Report, supra note 11, § II, ¶ 4. 
120 Id. 
121 Id. 
122 See generally Law of 1905, supra note 50; State Dep’t, France Report, supra note 9, 
§ II, ¶ 2. 
123 State Dep’t, France Report, supra note 9, § II, ¶ 2. 
124 Id.; Gunn, supra note 104, at 193–94. 
125 See generally Jacques Robert, Religious Liberty and French Secularism, 2003 BYU L. Rev. 
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 Finally, German law also avoids explicitly deªning religion, yet its 
system for granting public corporation status (with factors including a 
group’s permanence, size, and contribution to society) shows a now 
familiar bias toward viewing religion as a social or cultural phenome-
non.126 A hint of the public’s social concerns can also be seen in the 
need for religious communities to contribute to society; perhaps, this 
social contribution element stems from the country’s history and re-
sulting fear of anti-social, ideologically totalitarian groups.127
C. The Deªnitional Problems Encountered in International Instruments 
 The Universal Declaration, the European Convention, the Inter-
national Covenant, the 1981 Declaration, and the Concluding Docu-
ment all fail to deªne “religion,” perhaps implicitly recognizing the 
impossibility of an adequate deªnition.128 Yet, despite any deªnitional 
defecits, these instruments often use such broad and inclusive lan-
guage to list their protected freedoms that many of Gunn’s theoretical 
and linguistic challenges are almost met.129
 The Universal Declaration satisªes two of the three theoretical 
approaches to deªning religion by recognizing it both as an individ-
ual psychological experience (guaranteeing the right to change relig-
ions or beliefs) and/or a cultural or social experience (guaranteeing 
the right to practice alone or in a community).130 Likewise, the Uni-
versal Declaration fully embraces an inclusive, polythetic linguistic 
approach to deªning its freedoms.131 By not only including freedom 
of “thought” and “conscience” with freedom of religion, but also list-
ing the various actions and manifestations of spiritual belief, the Uni-
versal Declaration rejects an essentialist approach and recognizes that 
there may not be any one element that is common to all religions or 
systems of belief.132 In these ways, the Universal Declaration manages 
                                                                                                                      
126 German Constitution, supra note 60, art. 4; State Dep’t, Germany Report, supra 
note 12, § II, ¶ 2; Gunn, supra note 104, at 193–94. 
127 Gerhard Robbers, Religious Freedom in Germany, 2001 BYU L. Rev. 634, 661. 
128 Gunn, supra note 104, at 189–90. 
129 Lerner, supra note 70, at 907–08; Gunn, supra note 104, at 193–97. 
130 Universal Declaration, supra note 1, art. 18 (stating “[e]veryone has the right to 
freedom of thought, conscience and religion; this right includes freedom to change his 
religion or belief, and freedom, either alone or in community with others and in public or 
private, to manifest his religion or belief in teaching, practice, worship and observance”); 
Gunn, supra note 104, at 193–94. 
131 See Universal Declaration, supra note 1, art. 18. 
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to combat many of the deªciencies of deªnitions of “religion” without 
actually having to deªne the term.133
 Article 9, section 1 of the European Convention copies the exact 
language of article 18 of the Universal Declaration in its guarantee of 
“freedom of thought, conscience and religion” and its polythetic ap-
proach to protecting the various manifestations of religion or be-
lief.134 Furthermore, the Kokkinakas, Hoffman, and Manoussakis line of 
cases reveals that the ECHR’s interpretation of the European Conven-
tion prohibits state discrimination among various religions.135 There-
fore, the European Convention combines the Universal Declaration’s 
polythetic structure and its recognition of religion as both a psycho-
logical and a cultural experience with an ECHR interpretation that 
recognizes the practical discriminatory consequences of applying laws 
to peoples with established cultural biases.136 Yet, as is discussed in 
Section V of this paper, even instruments with language as broad and 
inclusive as that found in the European Convention can suffer from 
their neglecting to deªne religion.137
 As previously discussed, the ramiªcations of the International 
Covenant’s failure to deªne “religion” and “belief” have been recog-
nized by its own Human Rights Committee.138 The Committee bravely 
tried to reverse the failings of these deªnitional problems by stating 
that the terms should be broadly construed and the rights of traditional 
religions should also extend to “religions and beliefs with institutional 
characteristics or practices analogous to those of traditional relig-
ions.”139 The Committee even went on to explicitly denounce the use 
of deªnitional niceties to discriminate against minority religions.140 
Nevertheless, the combined International Covenant/Human Rights 
Committee approach simply addresses the practical concerns of 
deªning religion without addressing any of Gunn’s methodological 
problems.141 In order to stop discrimination against minority religions 
                                                                                                                      
133 See id.; Gunn, supra note 104, at 193–97. 
134 Compare European Convention, supra note 79, art. 9 with Universal Declaration, su-
pra note 1, art. 18. 
135 Miner, supra note 80, at 623–26. 
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and beliefs, as well as their analogues, it is still necessary to deªne “re-
ligion.”142
 As one might expect, since the 1981 Declaration and the Conclud-
ing Document are non-binding instruments, they have the leeway to go 
even further than the European Convention and the International 
Covenant in denouncing discrimination against minority religions and 
beliefs.143 Nevertheless, these documents’ strength of language is still 
fundamentally weakened by a lack of deªnitional certainty.144 For in-
stance, in clarifying its deªnition of “intolerance and discrimination 
based on religion or belief,” the 1981 Declaration seems to abandon 
any hope of deªning either “religion” or “belief,” and rather concen-
trates on a polythetic approach to deªning the various types of intoler-
ance and discrimination that may occur.145 As was the case with the 
European Convention and the International Covenant, the 1981 Dec-
laration’s attempt to broaden the protection for minority religions is 
laudable, but this broadening ignores the practical difªculties of pro-
tecting any right that remains undeªned.146 Similarly, the Concluding 
Document bravely seeks the prevention and elimination of all “dis-
crimination against individuals or communities on the grounds of relig-
ion or belief . . .”, yet neither of these grounds are deªned.147
IV. Abandon Deªnitions and Classiªcations of Religion and 
Rely upon Public Order Doctrines 
 The European legal environment of religious freedom is now quite 
polarized.148 International law seems to strive for an ever-broadening 
protection of religious freedom, and is therefore unable to deªne relig-
ion in a way that does not omit certain spiritual communities.149 On the 
other hand, knowingly or unknowingly, Russia, Belgium, France, and 
                                                                                                                      
142 See Lerner, supra note 70, 907–08. 
143 Compare European Convention, supra note 79, art. 9, with Lerner, supra note 70, 
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144 See Concluding Document, supra note 100, principles 16–16.11; see also 1981 Decla-
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Germany evade the reach of these international instruments by estab-
lishing a deªnitional hierarchy of spiritual communities that clearly 
places certain groups outside the deªnition of “religion.”150 Sometimes 
these countries’ deªnitions of religion are restrictive because of cul-
tural biases or preconceptions about the very nature of religion, but 
other times they simply stumble upon the linguistic difªculties of 
deªning a word that means many things to many people.151
 The preferred solution lies in a polythetic deªnition of religion 
that avoids discussing the nature of religion in favor of a list of its possi-
ble manifestations.152 In practical linguistic terms, this would not only 
enshrine freedoms “of” certain things (religion, belief, thought, and 
conscience), but also freedoms “to do” certain things in accordance 
with any system of beliefs (teach, practice, worship, and observe).153
 This language, and these concepts, are not new; in fact, in 1948, 
the Universal Declaration called for everyone to have the right “to 
manifest his religion or belief in teaching, practice, worship and ob-
servance”, and this exact language has been copied by the legally 
binding European Convention.154 However, the freedom “to do” lists 
found in these instruments are clearly and explicitly linked to mani-
festations of “religion.”155 By tying these freedoms to the word “relig-
ion” without deªning it, the Universal Declaration and European 
Convention allow states to deªne the term in ways that may contra-
vene the instruments’ very purpose.156
A. What Term Should Replace “Religion”? 
 It is tempting to consider phrases, such as “system of belief” or 
“faith-based community,” that might possibly serve as substitutions for 
“religion” in international instruments. Nevertheless, it is important 
to realize that any analogues of “religion” would fall into the same 
deªnitional pitfalls of the original term.157 Indeed, by its very nature, 
religion is (among other things) a practice that contemplates that 
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151 See State Dep’t, Russia Report, supra note 12, § II; State Dep’t, France Report, supra 
note 9, § II; State Dep’t, Germany Report, supra note 12, § II; State Dep’t, Belgium Report, 
supra note 11, § II; Gunn, supra note 104, at 193–97. 
152 See Gunn, supra note 104, at 193–95. 
153 Universal Declaration, supra note 1, art. 18. 
154 Id. 
155 Id.; European Convention, supra note 79, art. 9. 
156 See State Dep’t, Executive Summary, supra note 2, ¶¶ 4–6. 
157 See Gunn, supra note 104, at 193–97. 
450 Boston College International & Comparative Law Review [Vol. 28:429 
which cannot be readily explained by ordinary perceptions of real-
ity.158 It is this very feature that makes the term inherently impossible 
to deªne.159 Any attempt at an essentialist deªnition of religion 
through analogous terminology would almost, by necessity, rob the 
term of its intended meaning.160
 The preferred, although counter-intuitive, approach would be to 
guarantee religious freedom without even deªning religion or at-
tempting to ªnd analogous terminology.161 By protecting the manifes-
tations (teaching, practice, worship, and observance) of any belief 
system, international human rights instruments would protect relig-
ions from discriminatory treatment without even mentioning the 
word “religion.”162 Admittedly, such a deªnitional scheme would cer-
tainly challenge the cultural biases of many countries, as many non-
traditional systems of belief would gain the same protection from dis-
crimination as traditional religions.163 Indeed, under such a scheme it 
might even be difªcult to differentiate certain political or economic 
movements from spiritual ones; yet, it is perhaps easier to deal with 
such problems by deªning political and economic terminology, rather 
than struggling with spiritual terminology.164
 Furthermore, as is stated in the European Convention, each State 
will (and should) always retain the right to limit manifestations of re-
ligious freedom as is “necessary in a democratic society in the interests 
of public safety, for the protection of public order, health or morals, 
or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.”165 Reli-
ance upon such public order doctrines would protect states from 
dangerous individuals, while respecting and protecting the rights of 
any particular group of people.166
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Conclusion 
 Although it lacks a deªnition of religion, international law clearly 
does not accept the limitation of religious freedom due to deªnitional 
niceties. A country may not shirk its duty to assure each individual 
citizen equal freedoms of thought, conscience, religion, and belief. 
Nevertheless, even democratic countries with freedom of religion en-
shrined in their own constitutions continue to restrict religious free-
dom by discriminating against individuals, simply due to the traits of 
the spiritual communities to which those individuals belong. 
 Although certain cultural and social biases often contribute to 
these discriminatory deªnitional schemes, public safety is the over-
whelming legal justiªcation for treating “cults” and minority religions 
differently. Understanding this to be the case and recognizing their 
status as supposed paragons of human rights, Western democracies 
(such as Belgium, France, Germany, and Russia) ought to abandon 
preferential schemes for certain religious communities and rely upon 
currently existing public order doctrines. In other words, crack down 
on dangerous activities and individuals, not on religious groups that 
may or may not be prone to certain dangerous activities. 
